[azure-ai-ml] Fix path traversal vulnerability in storage download helpers#46693
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ayushhgarg-work wants to merge 5 commits into
Open
[azure-ai-ml] Fix path traversal vulnerability in storage download helpers#46693ayushhgarg-work wants to merge 5 commits into
ayushhgarg-work wants to merge 5 commits into
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Pull request overview
This PR addresses a CWE-22 path traversal risk in the artifact storage download helpers by validating that server-supplied blob/file paths resolve under the caller-provided destination directory before writing to disk.
Changes:
- Add resolved-path containment checks (via
Path.resolve()+Path.relative_to()) to block..traversal and other escaping paths during downloads. - Skip suspicious items and emit a warning log instead of writing outside the destination directory.
- Apply the same protection pattern across Blob, ADLS Gen2, and Fileshare download implementations.
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 3 out of 3 changed files in this pull request and generated 3 comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
sdk/ml/azure-ai-ml/azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_blob_storage_helper.py |
Adds destination/target resolution and containment checks before writing downloaded blobs. |
sdk/ml/azure-ai-ml/azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_gen2_storage_helper.py |
Adds equivalent containment validation for ADLS Gen2 get_paths() results prior to directory creation or file writes. |
sdk/ml/azure-ai-ml/azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_fileshare_storage_helper.py |
Adds containment validation for both file and subdirectory downloads in the recursive fileshare helper. |
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
Fixes a path traversal vulnerability (CWE-22) in the download methods of all three storage helpers that could allow server-supplied blob/file names containing
..segments to write files outside the intended destination directory.Changes
Added path validation in the download flows to ensure resolved target paths remain within the caller-specified destination directory. Malicious paths are skipped with a warning log.
Affected files:
azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_blob_storage_helper.py—BlobStorageClient.download()azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_gen2_storage_helper.py—Gen2StorageClient.download()azure/ai/ml/_artifacts/_fileshare_storage_helper.py—recursive_download()Details
The
downloadmethods construct local file paths from server-returned blob/file names without verifying the resolved path stays under the destination. A name like../../etc/maliciouswould escape the download directory.The fix resolves both the destination and target to absolute paths, then uses
Path.relative_to()to confirm the target is a descendant of the destination. Items that fail this check are skipped and a warning is logged.